Yogendra Yadav vs State of Jharkhand (Criminal Appeal No.1205/2014)
Section 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure prescribe which
offences can be compromised (called “compounding of offences” in legal
language) by the parties themselves and which offences can be compromised by
them with the permission of the court. The remaining offences which do not find
mention in Section 320 CrPC can not be compromised even with the permission of
the Court.
The facts of the case in brief are that complainant got
registered an FIR under Sections 341, 323, 324, 504 and 307 read with Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) alleging that appellants assaulted him and his
men. On the same day, appellants also got registered an FIR under Sections 147,
148, 149, 448, 341, 323 and 380 of the IPC regarding the same incident alleging
that complainant and his men assaulted them. In both the cases, after
investigation, charge-sheet was submitted.
While the cases were going on before trial court, both the
parties agreed to compromise the cases. A Panchayat was held where with the
intervention of the well-wishers a compromise was arrived at. A compromise
petition dated 16/11/2011 was signed by both the parties and it was filed in
the trial Court. The trial court observed that offences under Sections 324,
341, 323 of the IPC are compoundable with the permission of the court and hence
said offences were compounded and the accused were acquitted of the same.
However, the trial court observed that offences under Sections 326, 307 read
with Section 34 of the IPC are non-compoundable and hence directed that the
case should proceed against the accused for offences under Sections 326, 307
read with Section 34 of the IPC.
This order was challenged by the appellants in the High
Court of Jharkhand but the High court dismissed the challenge. The appellants
then moved the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court by its judgment on 21st July
2014 allowed the appeal and set aside the trial court’s and High court’s order
and compounded the non-compoundable offences and quashed the proceedings. The Supreme
Court relied on its earlier judgment in the case of Gian Singh vs State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 (wherein the
Supreme Court had held that where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding
having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim
has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in
its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in
futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties
is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the
ultimate guiding factor). The Supreme Court held that in a given case, the High
Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section
482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably
settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the
offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its
discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of
each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape,
murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will
have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be
restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it
may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced
that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect
public peace or tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such
proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends
of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the
prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would
be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct
restoration of peace.
Though State of Jharkhand filed an affidavit opposing the
compromise, but the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings in view of the compromise and
in view of the legal position.
Manohar singh vs
State of Madhya Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No.1498/2014)
In another matter on same day, the Supreme court held that
where the parties enter into a compromise after the conviction has been
recorded after trial, the non-compoundable offences can not be compounded. However,
in such a situation if the court feels that the parties have a real desire to
bury the hatchet in the interest of peace, it can reduce the sentence of the accused
to the sentence already undergone (relying on Supreme Court’s earlier decision
in Narinder Singh vs State of Punjab
JT 2014 (4) SC 573). In this case, the offence involved was Section 498-A IPC
and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act. Appellant was convicted under both and was
sentenced. His appeal was rejected by the High Court. During his appeal in
Supreme Court, he made a statement that he was willing to give monetary
compensation to his wife in lieu of substantive sentence of imprisonment. His
wife appeared and stated that if the appellant pays her Rs.2,50,000/- as
compensation, she is ready to settle the matter. The appellant brought the
demand draft of said amount. The counsel
for both parties requested the Court to show leniency in view of the settlement,
however counsel for State opposed the prayer. The Supreme court, while
maintaining the conviction, reduced the sentence to the sentence already
undergone by the husband subject to his paying Rs.2.50 lakh to the wife, in the
interest of peace and amity.
Sathiyamoorthy vs
State (Criminal Appeal No. 1169/2014)
In yet another case on the same day, in respect of the
offences under Sections 148 and 149 of the IPC (rioting, armed with deadly
weapon), the supreme Court reduced the sentence to the sentence already
undergone, in view of compromise between the accused and the victim.
